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INCREASING STATE RESTRICTIONS ON RUSSIAN PROTESTANT 
SEMINARIES 
By Mark R. Elliott 
Mark R. Elliott, retired professor of history, earned a B.A. from Asbury University and an M.A. 
and Ph.D. from the University of Kentucky. He taught at Asbury University, Wilmore, Kentucky; 
Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois; Samford University, Birmingham, Alabama; and Southern 
Wesleyan University, Central, South Carolina. At Wheaton College Dr. Elliott served for 13 years 
as director of the Institute for East-West Christian Studies, and at Samford University he served 
for six years as director of the Global Center at Beeson Divinity School. He served as editor of the 
East-West Church and Ministry Report (www.eastwestreport.org) from its founding in 1993 
through 2017. He now serves as editor emeritus. He is also an Advisory Editor of OPREE. 
Introduction 
Ivan Smirnov, I will call him, is originally from one of the western republics of the former 
Soviet Union, but presently studies in a provincial Russian Protestant seminary that authorit ies 
have attempted to close. Ivan believes it is providential his training has been able to continue: “Our 
God in His infinite grace has allowed our school to go on as an institution of higher education.” 
So far, courts have ruled three times that the Russian Ministry of Education and Science “did not 
have any credible evidence which would give warrant to the state to shut us down.” At one point 
the seminary’s license was revoked but later reinstated, for which Ivan is thankful: “Praise the 
Lord for His mercy and protection!” 
This young seminarian comes from a believing family: “My grandmother was threatened 
with drowning for her faith back in the early days of Communism.” Later, “my father was not 
allowed to continue studies” even though he was an excellent student. Ivan relates he “chose to 
follow Christ at the age of 15,” and since the end of Communist Party rule he has had the 
opportunity to openly serve in his church and pursue a theological education. He considers his life 
busy but blessed: “I am currently serving in the counseling ministry in my local church as well as 
preach and lead a small group.” In seminary he has specialized in the study of the Old Testament 
and Hebrew, “so naturally the OT books of the Bible have had an impact on me.” 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2020) XL, 4 1
 Ivan is aware of growing outside pressures on his church and his seminary: “There are 
some challenges from authorities in the life of the evangelical congregations…connected to 
the…[2016] anti-missionary [Yarovaya] law which has restricted the work of missionaries outside 
of the church premises.” As for his seminary, to date the difficulties have been felt “mostly in the 
Academic Dean’s office.” Students carry on with their studies, although interspersed with periodic 
“updates about the current status of the legal process…. The vast majority of…students come 
motivated to gain proficiency and get equipped in a particular area of ministry. The question of a 
diploma (accreditation, licensure, etc.) is secondary.”1 Increasing state pressures upon Protestant 
seminaries to which “Ivan Smirnov” refers, is the subject of the present paper. 
 
Summary of Statutes Affecting Protestant Seminaries 
Russian Federation statutes applicable to the country’s Protestant seminaries are of two 
types: 1) broad-stroke legislation that regulates church-state relations and non-governmenta l 
organizations (NGOs), and 2) laws regulating higher (tertiary) education. The first category 
includes the 1990 Law “On Freedom of Conscience,” whose generous provisions were radically 
eviscerated in 1997 and 2016 legislation,2 and the 2012 NGO Foreign Agent Law.3 The second 
category includes a 1992 statute legalizing private higher education,4 a 2004 presidential decree 
establishing the Federal Service for Supervision of Education and Science (Rosobrnadzor);5 a 2008 
law “On Changes…Concerning Licensing and Accreditation of Professional Religious Schools,”6 
and  a 2012 Federal Law “On Education.”7 
Notes: 
1 “Ivan Smirnov,” emails to author, 9 and 12 January 2020. 
2 Elizaveta Potapova and Stefan Trines, “Education in the Russian Federation,” World Education News + Reviews, 6 
June 2017; https://wenr.wes.org/2017/06/education-in-the-russian-federation. 
3 “Russia: Four Years of Putin’s Foreign Agents’ Law to Shackle and Silence NGOs,” Amn esty International, 18 
November 2016; https:www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/russia-four-years-of-putins-foreign-agents-law-to-
shackle-and-silence-ngos/. 
4 Dmitry A. Suspitsin, “Between the State and the Market: Sources of Sponsorship and Legitimacy in Russian Nonstate 
Higher Education” in Private Higher Education in Post-Communist Europe: In Search of Legitimacy. ed. by Snejana 
Slantcheva and Daniel C. Levy (London: Macmillan Palgrave, 2017), 157 and 160-61. 
5 Decree No. 314, 9 March 2004, “On the System and Structure of Federal Executive Authorities;” 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/rus_e/WTACCRUS50_LEG_1.pdf. See also Konstantin Petrenko and Perry L. 
Glanzer, “The Recent Emergence of Private Christian Colleges and Universities in Russia: Historical Reasons and 
Contemporary Developments,” Christian Higher Education 4 (2005), 95. 
6 “Putin Signs into Law a Bill on State Accreditation of Religious Schools,” Interfax, 29 February 2008. 
7 No. 273-FZ. See Sergey Chervonenko, “Proverka ot Rosobrnadzora: itogi i mysli [Verification from Rosobrnadzor; 
Results and Thoughts], 23 August 2019; medium.com@chervonenko/proverka-ot-rosobrnadzora-itogi-i-mys li-
b340a766ffc7; Potopova and Trines, “Education,” 8; 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail%3Fp_lang%Den26p_isn%3D93529. 
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 Church-State and NGO Legislation 
As regards church-state legislation, the 1990 Law On Freedom of Conscience made 
provision for religious expression to an extent never before realized in Russian history and rarely 
achieved by any state worldwide.8 In the law’s wake Russian Protestants, whose last Bible school 
Soviet authorities had closed in 1929, energetically, even frantically, launched numerous pastoral 
training programs with the help of coreligionists from abroad.9 The number increased from a 
handful in 1992 to 71 in 1999. (For the entire former Soviet Union the number of Protestant 
theological institutions increased from approximately 40 in 1992 to 137 in 1999.)10  
1997 Duma legislation “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations Act,” 
signed by President Boris Yeltsin, reversed the trend, introducing major impediments to the free 
exercise of religion.11 However, two factors temporarily ameliorated some of the harshest 
restrictions imposed by this statute. First, uneven and sometimes haphazard enforcement was the 
rule in a state in which arbitrary administrative practice has always counted for more than the letter 
of the law. Second, Russia’s Constitutional Court nullified some of the law’s most repressive 
provisions.12  
In contrast, 2016 legislation “On Combatting Terrorism” (No. 374-FZ), popularly known 
as the Yarovaya Law after the Duma deputy who introduced the bill, more aggressively infringes 
upon the rights of non-Orthodox religious adherents. Styled as an anti-terrorist measure, it in 
reality significantly curtails foreign and domestic missionary efforts very broadly defined and 
sharply undermines freedom of assembly and speech for all of Russia’s non-Orthodox believers. 
President Vladimir Putin’s much greater control over Russian courts, compared to Yeltsin, has 
8 Mark Elliott, “New Opportunities, New Demands in the Old Red Empire,” Evangelical Missions Quarterly 28 
(January 1992): 32-39. 
9Mark Elliott, “Protestant Theological Education in the Former Soviet Union,” International Bulletin of Missionary 
Research 18 (January 1994): 14.  
10 Spravochnik bogoslovskie uchebnye zavedeniya v stranakh SNG i Baltii (Moscow: Assotsiatsiya “Dukhovnoe 
Vozrozhdenie,” 199). See also Hunter Baker, “Russian Seminaries’ Enrollment Woes,” Christianity Today online, 8 
November 2007. 
11 https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/russsia/2941574/on-freedom-of-conscience-and-relig ious -
association-act.html. 
12 Mark Elliott, “New Restrictive Law on Religion in Russia,” East-West Church and Ministry Report 5 (Summer 
1997): 1-2; Lauren Homer, “Human Rights Lawyer Criticizes New Russian Religion Law,” East-West Church and 
Ministry Report 5 (Summer 1997): 2-3; “Commentary on the New Russian Law on Religion,” East-West Church and 
Ministry Report 5 (Summer 1997): 3-5; Mark Elliott, “The New Russian Law on Religion: What Is the Fallout for 
Evangelicals?” East-West Church and Ministry Report 5 (Fall 1997): 4-5. 
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also added teeth to Yarovaya restrictions upon minority faiths. In such a climate, Protestant 
seminaries were bound to suffer. According to one American respondent who previously taught in 
a Protestant seminary, the 2016 Yarovaya legislation had an immediate chilling effect upon 
widespread utilization of U.S. faculty in theological programs. Returning to Russia in early 2017, 
this individual was interrogated by an FSB agent for over an hour, one line of questioning centering 
on why Americans were needed as seminary instructors.13  
Lastly, on the macro level, 2012 NGO legislation amounted to a fundamental assault on 
Russian civil society. Not surprisingly, branding private entities that receive financial support from 
abroad with the pejorative label of “foreign agent” led to the closure or reduced effectiveness of 
many Russian NGOs.14 Religious bodies, including Protestant seminaries, which to this day 
receive Western and South Korean financial assistance, are exempt from the “foreign agent” 
moniker. Nevertheless, state-controlled media have crafted a hostile public perception of these 
pastoral training programs based in part on their ties abroad. As a result, they live in fear that their 
official status might yet be tarnished with the “foreign agent” brush. 
 
Higher Education Legislation 
A review of educational legislation affecting Protestant seminaries begins with the Duma’s 
legalization of private higher education in 1992.15 The number of such institutions subsequently 
increased in just over a decade from 78 in 1993-94 to 409 in 2004-05, while private higher 
education enrollment increased in the same years from 70,000 to over one million, or roughly 15 
percent of total tertiary enrollment.16 
13 Maria Kravchenko, “Inventing Extremists: The Impact of Russian Anti-Extremism Policies on Freedom of Religion 
or Belief,” United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, January 2018;  
https://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/special-reports/inventing-extremists-the-impact-russian-anti-extremism-
policies; Alexei Markevich, “Mission of Russian Christian Education,” E. Stanley Jones School of World Missions 
and Evangelism, Asbury Theological Seminary, 6 May 2019; Anonymous, email to author, 10 February 2020. 
14 Katherin Machalek, “Factsheet: Russia’s NGO Laws,” Freedom House, [2013]; https://freedomhouse.org.  
15 Potapova and Trines, “Education;” and Daria Platonova and Dmitry Semyonov, “Russia: The Institutional 
Landscape of Russian Higher Education” in 25 Years of Transformations of Higher Education Systems in Post-Soviet 
Countries (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-52980-6-13; p. 345. 
16Dmitry A Suspitsin, “Private Higher Education in Russia: The Quest for Legitimacy,” Ph.D. dissertation, 
Pennsylvania State University, 2007; Suspitsyn, “Between the State and the Market,” 160-61; Anthony W. Morgan 
and Nadezhda V. Kulikova, “Reform and Adaptation in Russian Higher Education, An Institutional Perspe ctive,” 
European Education 39 (Fall 2007): 42; Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 15; and Platonova and Semyonov, 
“Russia,” 345. 
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For a host of reasons the state came to view this growth of private institutions as 
uncontrolled and problematic, as it also deemed the increase in the total number of higher 
educational programs, private and public, to 1,071 by 2007.17 State responses have included the 
presidential decree of 2004 and legislation in 2008 and 2012 previously noted. Rosobrnadzor, the 
federal higher education regulatory agency established in 2004, found its authority greatly 
enhanced by means of the 2008 and 2012 statutes. Konstantin Petrenko and Perry Glanzer (Baylor 
University) note that “The centralized nature of Russian higher education and the influence that 
the Ministry of Education exerts over a school’s curriculum would be surprising to anyone in the 
West.”18 
With Putin publicly mandating improved quality and increased competitiveness in higher 
education, Rosobrnadzor was charged with responsibility for close scrutiny of the performance of 
all post-secondary institutions.19 By the 2015-16 school year the number of universities and 
institutes stood at 896, down 175 in a decade.20 In 2014-17 alone Rosobrnadzor revoked 58 
educational licenses, terminated the accreditation of 125 institutions, and ordered a halt to 
admissions in an additional 68 universities. Seventy of these programs reopened after correcting 
Rosobrnadzor citations, but the trajectory of tightened, potentially lethal oversight was clear.21 In 
2015 Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livanov referred to the process as a “clean-up” 
of higher education. His goal was a 40 percent reduction in the number of public universities and 
an 80 percent reduction in their branch campuses.22 The outcome has been the state’s ongoing 
merger of “inefficient” universities and the closure, to date, of roughly half of all branch 
campuses.23  
Livanov also specifically targeted non-public institutions: “We want to reduce private 
universities which provide low quality education.”24 Even before Livanov’s tenure, his predecessor 
as Minister of Education and Science, Andrei Fursenko (2004-12), had publicly stated a goal of “a 
17 Morgan and Kulikova, “Reform,” 57; and Suspitsyn, “Private Higher Education,” 1. 
18 Petrenko and Glanzer, “The Recent Emergence,” 92. 
19 Andrei Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” Social Research 76 (Spring 2009): 215-16. For the Rosobrdnadzor 
website see obrnadzor.gov.ru/ru/. 
20 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 15. 
21 “Russia’s Higher Education Institutions are Disappearing,” khodorkovsky.com/russias -higher-education-
institutions-disappearing. 
22 “Russia’s Higher Education.” 
23 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 5. 
24 “Russia’s Higher Education.” See also Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 4. 
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maximum 50 universities and 150 to 200 institutes of higher education.”25 Rector Gennadi 
Pshenichny of Kuban Evangelical Christian University deems a 2015 Rosobrnadzor “audit” of 
non-state schools as “in reality…a state-sanctioned lever to decrease the number of private 
institutions of higher learning and funnel the students into state-sponsored/state sanctioned 
schools.”26 
 
Factors Behind Increasing Oversight: Quality Control 
In analyzing factors behind increasing state oversight of post-secondary education 
commentators frequently cite the need for greater quality control. This explanation is the case not 
only with Putin and the Russian Ministry of Education and Science, but even with some Protestant 
theological educators. Aleksandr Spichak, academic dean of the Protestant Trinity Video Seminary 
in Kursk, writes, “Many secular universities are closed down…because many of them were just 
selling diplomas, and the government does want to improve the quality of higher education and 
get rid of fake institutions.”27 Sergey Chervonenko, administrator at the interdenominationa l 
Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary, notes, “In the period of the 90s, there was no order in 
the country….There was no regulation of educational activities, so a great many educational 
institutions appeared that were distributing diplomas.”28  
The early post-Soviet period was indeed rife with for-profit as well as nonprofit programs 
of uneven quality, popularly characterized as “diploma mills.”29 Professor Olga Zaprometova, 
holder of two earned doctorates and former dean of the Pentecostal Eurasian Theologica l 
Seminary, has taught and currently teaches biblical studies at a number of Moscow’s Protestant 
and Orthodox seminaries. Her opinion is that “the Lord is using these [Rosobrnadzor] visits to 
improve the educational level of Protestant seminaries.” She adds that professors need to teach 
only in their fields of expertise, that faculty need to be engaged in professional growth and 
development, that administrators need assistance in honing their competencies, and that future 
pastors need instruction in proper command of the Russian language. When asked if increasing 
25 “Russian Education Minister Calls for Pruning Vast State Higher-Education System,” Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 25 July 2008. 
26 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019. 
27 Aleksandr Spichak, email to author, 11 December 2019. 
28 Sergey Chervonenko, email to author, 23 August 2019. 
29 John A. Bernbaum, Opening the Red Door; The Inside Story of Russia’s First Christian Liberal Arts University 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2019), 190. 
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state oversight of higher education, including Protestant seminaries, was part of an overall 
government strategy to bring all sectors of Russian society under closer supervision, Zaprometova 
responded,  
I am not so sure about it, but it is a wise strategy, because there is no supervision of the 
Christian schools by church officials (board members, etc.), plus quite often board 
members are not qualified enough for this ministry, they do not have higher education or 
got it recently, even online or from the same Christian school, there are almost no Ph.D.s 
among church supervisors, and without supervision, especially in the academy, the quality 
of Christian education is drastically going down!30 
 
Factors Behind Increasing Oversight: Demographics 
In addition to improved quality as a motivation for audits, other factors appear to be at play 
behind Rosobrnadzor’s strict accounting of higher education in general and Protestant seminar ies 
in particular. First, demographics come to bear on the issue.31 A 2005 estimate projected a Russian 
population decline from 144.1 million in 2004 to 50 to 100 million by 2050.32 As this population 
shortfall relates to education, between 2000/01 and 2014/15 the number of secondary school 
graduates fell from 1.46 million to 701,400, with a resulting drop in tertiary enrollment from 7.5 
million to 4.2 million students between 2008/09 and 2014/15.33 The projected decrease in higher 
education enrollments— “by as much as 56 percent between 2008 and 2021”—undoubted ly 
contributes to state measures to reduce the number of institutions—and associated costs—of higher 
education.34 Thus, cuts in tertiary education expenditures and school mergers and closures stem in 
part from budgetary pressures. Educational funding has also been compromised by falling tax 
revenues due to declining oil and gas prices and Western sanctions triggered by Russian 
annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in eastern Ukraine.35 
One consequence of Russia’s demographic decline is heightened competition for higher 
education enrollment and lobbying by public institutions to reduce competition from their private 
30 Olga Zaprometova, email to author, 9 October 2019. 
31Vladimir A. Geroimenko, Grigori A. Kliucharev, and W. John Morgan, “Private Higher Education in Russia: 
Capacity for Innovation and Investment,” European Journal of Education; Research, Development and Policy  47 (No. 
1, 2012); https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-3425.2011.01509.x; Perry L. Glanzer and Konstantin Petrenko, “Private 
Christian Colleges and Universities in the Former Soviet Union,” East-West Church and Ministry Report 14 (Spring  
2006): 11; and Petrenko and Glanzer, “Recent Emergence,” 93. 
32 Morgan and Kulikova, “Reform,” 55. See also “Russia’s Natural Population Decline to Hit 11-Year Record in 
2019,” Moscow Times, 13 December 2019. 
33 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 4. See also Kortunov. “Russian Higher Education,”  214. 
34 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 3. See also Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 213.  
35 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 2-4. See also Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 208. 
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counterparts.36 And as noted, the state has obliged by making life more difficult for non-public 
universities and institutes. 
 
Factors Behind Increasing Oversight: The Predictable Goal of an Authoritarian State  
In 2019-20 Protestant educators and leaders gave responses to the following survey 
question:  
Is increasing Russian state oversight of private educational institutions, includ ing 
Protestant seminaries, a justifiable effort to standardize higher education and ensure quality 
[or] part of an overall government strategy to bring all sectors of Russian society under 
closer state supervision?37  
 
Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary’s Sergey Chervonenko answered, “Rosobrnadzor 
checks, in my humble opinion, are part of a program aimed at strengthening control over 
education.” Yet he views this oversight positively because thereby “Religious universities have 
the opportunity to stand on a par with state universities.”38 The leader of one Protestant 
denomination related a “tough but successful” Rosobrnadzor inspection of his church’s seminary, 
but did not consider it to be discrimination against non-Orthodox. Rather, he viewed it as part of 
the “overall trend in all sectors of society to have more [state] control.”39 Similarly, but less 
positively, Roman Lunkin, a scholar of religion in the Russian Academy of Sciences, contends, 
“The Russian state’s policy on religious education has become a mirror image of its sweeping 
control over all social initiatives and non-governmental organizations.”40  
Several personal observations are in order. First, it bears noting that authoritarianism has 
been a characteristic of the Russian state for centuries—under tsars, commissars, and now Putin. 
As regards Russian higher education today, sources are uniform in recognizing growing state 
involvement. Judging whether or not this increased oversight is for good or ill is where 
disagreements occur. Certainly, quality control has its place. However, augmented control does 
not necessarily guarantee quality. To the contrary, as coming case studies will attest, rigorous 
36 Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 208 and 216; Morgan and Kulikova, “Reform,” 56. 
37 Mark R. Elliott, emails to Russian Protestant educators and leaders, 8 and 29 October 2019; 4 and 8 December 2019;  
9 February 2020. 
38 Sergey Chervonenko, email to author, 23 August 2019. 
39 Anonymous, email to author, 25 October 2019. 
40 Roman Lunkin, “Theology for a Select Few: Soviet Déja Vu for Russia’s Protestants?” East-West Church Review 
27 (No. 3, 2019): 11. 
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oversight can actually undermine quality through personal bias, arbitrariness, and corruption, 
faults greater controls ironically are meant to reduce. 
One consequence of increasing supervision of higher education that the state, no doubt, 
finds especially useful is the greater ease it affords it in controlling the tertiary sector. Authorita r ian 
rule in Russia has a longstanding penchant for consolidation for the sake of “efficiency.” Two 
examples may illustrate the point. In 1944 Stalin required the merger of the Evangelical Christian 
and Baptist denominations to facilitate the streamlining of Kremlin directives to Protestants 
through a single, centralized administrative structure. Second, in 2007 Putin managed the 
improbable absorption of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) into the Russian 
Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, the very body that ROCA had anathematized for decades 
as a pawn of the Soviet state. It may be argued that Putin engineered this merger for much the 
same reason that Stalin created the Evangelical Christian-Baptist Union: for ease of control, in this 
latter case, to better coordinate the utilization of Russian Orthodox/Kremlin soft power abroad. 
 
Factors Behind Increasing Oversight: Fighting Corruption 
A commendable aspiration of Rosobrnadzor has been its fight against corruption in higher 
education. Transparency International’s most recent Corruption Perceptions Index (2019) ranks 
Russia 137th out of 180 countries, a drop from its 131st place out of 176 countries in 2017.41 
Corruption has been a widely recognized feature of Russian life for centuries under both tsars and 
commissars. The tsarist era is replete with accounts depicting bribery and corruption as both 
corrosive and commonplace, including Journey for Our Time by French memoirist the Marquis de 
Custine (1839); The History of a Town (1870) and The Golovlyov Family (1876) by satirist Mikhail 
Saltykov-Shchedrin; and most famously, The Inspector General (1836) and Dead Souls (1842) by 
Nikolai Gogol. Study of the massive scale of extra-legal economic activity in the Soviet era is 
associated especially with the pioneering work of Gregory Grossman, beginning in the 1970s.42 In 
41 transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2019. On current state efforts to combat 
corruption in higher education see “Protivodeistvie korruptsii;” obrnadzor.gov.ru. 
42 “The Second Economy of the USSR,” Problems of Communism 26 (No. 5, 1977): 25-40. Among the subsequent 
legions of studies of corruption in the Soviet Union see Konstantin M. Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1982); William A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom; Combatting Corruption 
in the Political Elite, 1965-1990 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Louise L. Shelley, Policing Soviet Society; The 
Evolution of State Control (London: Routledge, 1996): and Stephen Lovell, Aleena Ledeneva, and Andrei 
Rogachevskii, Bribery and Blat in Russia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); James Heinzen, The Art of the Bribe; 
Corruption under Stalin, 1943-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). 
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the post-Soviet era, some argue, corruption has reached colossal proportions beyond anything ever 
before endured in Russia. Since 1991 the nation’s assets have been plundered for private gain on 
a massive scale by a consortium of mafia, state officials, past and present security service 
operatives, and newly minted billionaire oligarchs.43 
Corrupt practices in higher education, ubiquitous in the Soviet era, have continued 
unabated since the collapse of the Soviet Union.44 Elizaveta Potapova, research fellow of the 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
notes that post-secondary education “is particularly vulnerable to corruption” because most faculty 
are poorly paid, and many students “are willing to pay instructors for better grades, revised 
transcripts, and more.”45 Gennadi Gudkov, head of a Duma Anti-Corruption Committee, estimates 
that the bill for corruption in higher education may total the equivalent of one billion dollars 
annually. In Moscow alone, this Duma committee asserts, “each year 30 to 40 professors are caught 
accepting bribes in exchange for grades.”46  
University admissions have been particularly susceptible to malpractice. Bribes to gain 
admittance to Moscow universities and institutes are estimated to have totaled $520 million USD 
in 2008 alone, with individual student under-the-table payments up to $5,000. In 2009 
Rosobrnadzor made mandatory a nationwide standardized higher education admissions test aimed 
at eliminating fraud in the process, which did reduce direct bribes. However, corruption is said to 
continue through payments for covert distribution of test questions and post-exam correction of 
wrong answers.47 
Other corrupt practices in higher education include the sale of diplomas and plagiar ized 
and ghost-written papers and dissertations. Some studies suggest that since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union 30 to 50 percent of Russian doctoral degrees in law and medicine have been 
43 Most stunning and comprehensive is Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy; Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2014). See also Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, Policing Economic Crime in Russia; From Soviet Planned 
Economy to Privatization (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); and Vladimir Soloviev, Empire of 
Corruption (Tilburg, Netherlands: Glagoslav Publications, 2012). 
44 Morgan and Kulikova, “Reform,” 59; Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 206. 
45 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 3. See also Anna Numtsova, “In Russia, Corruption Plagues the Higher -
Education System,” Chronicle of Higher Education  54 (No. 24, 2008), A18-A20. 
46 Nemtsova, “In Russia,” A18-A20. 
47 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 12-13. 
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plagiarized and that 20 to 30 percent of dissertations have been “purchased on the black market.”48 
In the same vein, “a 2015 study by the Dissernet Project, an organization dedicated to exposing 
academic fraud, found that one in nine politicians in the lower house of the Russian parliament 
had a plagiarized or fake academic degree.”49 A 2006 Brookings Institution study of Vladimir 
Putin’s 1997 dissertation speaks to the pervasiveness of fraud that is seemingly endemic in Russian 
higher education. Brookings fellows Clifford Gaddy and Igor Danchenko determined that in 
Putin’s dissertation “More than 16 pages worth of text [out of a nearly 20-page segment] were 
taken verbatim” from Strategic Planning and Policy by American economists William King and 
David Cleland. Even more disturbing than Putin’s plagiarism is the fact that “The scandal…led 
nowhere.”50 Given these facts, is it possible for a plagiarist to succeed in superintending a 
significant upgrade in the quality of Russian higher education? More colloquially, can a fox guard 
a hen house?    
 
Orthodox Advantages and Protestant Disadvantages 
 State dealings with Russian Orthodox seminaries, in comparison with Protestant 
seminaries, underscore the disadvantages the latter face. On the one hand, theological educator 
Zaprometova observes that Orthodox theological schools away from Moscow often face serious 
challenges from Rosobrnadzor. As a result, many Orthodox, as well as Protestant seminaries, have 
chosen not to seek state accreditation as too burdensome a process.51 As theologian John Burgess, 
author of Holy Rus; The Rebirth of Orthodoxy in the New Russia, has put it, theological educators 
of diverse confessions dread the weight of “heavy-handed bureaucracy” that accreditation entails. 
Illustrating the “reality of a highly bureaucratized society,” he notes that state authorit ies 
threatened Belgorod Orthodox Seminary with a fine for a minor infraction: its website was said 
not to be up-to-date.52 On the other hand, Orthodox institutions in Moscow which have obtained 
state accreditation, such as St. Tikhon Orthodox Humanitarian University and the Russian 
48 Stefan Trines, “Academic Fraud, Corruption, and Implications for Credential Assessment,” World Education News 
+ Reviews, 10 December 2017; wenr.wes.org/2017/12/academic -fraud-corruption-and-implications-for-credent ial-
assessment. 
49 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 13. 
50 Olga Khvostunova. “Plagiarism-gate,” Institute of Modern Russia, 7 May 2013; imrussia.org/en/nation/453-
plagiarism-gate. 
51 Olga Zaprometova, email to author, 9 October 2019; Aleksandr Spichak, email to author, 11 December 2019. 
52 John Burgess, phone interview with author, 16 September 2019. 
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Orthodox University of St. John the Theologian, have had no difficulty securing it, “probably due 
to their political connections and influence.”53  
 Also to the advantage of Orthodox is the relative ease with which they obtain premises for 
instruction. The state, for example, has afforded St. Tikhon and St. John free or nearly free use of 
Moscow buildings that had been the property of the Orthodox Church before the 1917 Revolut ion. 
Rector John Ekonomtsev of St. John regretted how “very difficult” it was “to actually get a 
building free of charge.” The Patriarch reportedly approached Putin personally to help secure St. 
John’s building.54 In contrast, Protestant seminaries have typically encountered protracted 
difficulties gaining permission to build, lease, or rent property at any cost. Protestant educators 
could only hope for the “troubles” Orthodox experience finding facilities. That government 
authorities called upon St. Tikhon University to write state standards for theological degrees, 
applicable to non-Orthodox, even Jewish and Islamic, as well as Orthodox institutions, is another 
indication of the Kremlin’s favoring Orthodoxy.55 As Russian Academy of Sciences scholar 
Roman Lunkin notes, “It is clear from…state religious policy trends that officials often understand 
protection of the Russian Orthodox Church as necessitating discrimination of other religious 
communities.”56  
 It may be argued that the Russian Orthodox Church enjoys the de facto status of an 
established church. Patriarch Kyrill’s frequent public appearances with President Putin and the 
panoply of legislative restrictions placed upon non-Orthodox faiths since 1997 form the context in 
which punitive state scrutiny of Protestant seminaries should be understood. In this author’s 2019-
20 survey of Protestant theological educators and church leaders, three options were posed as 
possible explanations for “increasing Russian state oversight of private educational institutions, 
including Protestant seminaries.” Two of the three have been previously discussed: option one, “a 
justifiable effort to standardize higher education and ensure quality,” and option two, “an overall 
government strategy to bring all sectors of Russian society under closer state supervision.”  
53 Perry L. Glanzer and Konstantin Petrenko, “Ressurecting the Russian University’s Soul: The Emergence of Eastern 
Orthodox Universities and Their Distinctive Approaches to Keeping Faith with Tradition,” Christian Scholar’s Review 
36 (Spring 2007): 281. See also Petrenko and Glanzer, “Recent Emergence,” 90. 
54 Glanzer and Petrenko, “Resurrecting,” 281. 
55 Hunter Baker, “Christian Higher Education Goes to Russia,”  Christianity Today online, 2 August 2007; Glanzer 
and Petrenko, “Resurrecting,” 273. 
56 Lunkin, “Theology,” 13. 
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        The third option offered to account for impediments facing Protestant seminaries is to view 
them as part of state measures to discriminate against, and in some cases suppress, non-Orthodox 
faiths, in keeping with the close collaboration between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church. 
In a sentence, ample evidence exists to conclude that all three factors contribute to the challenges 
faced by Protestant pastoral training programs.  
        This is not the place to enumerate the myriad ways in which Russian state policies margina l ize 
and state-dominated media malign non-Orthodox faiths, despite formal constitutional protections 
for freedom of conscience for all. The Russian Constitution explicitly states, “Religious 
associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the law.”57  
 Just one facet of the uphill struggle faced by Russian Protestants should suffice to illustrate 
the point. Compared to the thousands of Russian Orthodox parishes now in possession of churches 
returned to them by the state, Protestants and other non-Orthodox confessions frequently struggle 
to secure and hold on to places of worship. Roman Lunkin notes that “local officials prefer not to 
apply the 2010 Law on Restitution of Property of Religious Significance to Religious 
Organizations to churches other than the Russian Orthodox Church.” Examples abound. Old 
Believers have been denied the return of their church buildings in Kirov, St. Petersburg, Saratov, 
and their Dormition Church in Moscow. Similarly, Roman Catholics have been unable to retrieve 
Sts. Peter and Paul Church in Moscow, nor their previously confiscated sanctuaries in Barnaul, 
57 Mikhail Strokan, “Church-State Relations and Property Restitution in Modern Russia,” Washington, DC, Center 
for Strategic & International Relations, 18 August 2016; https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/church-state-
relations-and-property-restitution-modern-russia, p. 210. Since the early 1990s the free exercise of religion in post-
Soviet space has been a constant theme in the pages of the East-West Church and Ministry Report which I served as 
editor from 1993 through 2017. For a sampling of reporting on state infringements upon the constitutionally protected 
rights of Russian Protestants see: Victoria Arnold, “RUSSIA: 159 Anti-Missionary Prosecutions in 2018—Lis t ,” 
Forum 18, 7 May 2019; Victoria Arnold, “RUSSIA: Increasing Land Use Fines ‘a Lottery,’” Forum 18, 20 March 
2018; www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_ id=2362; Roman Lunkin, “Do More Than Two Not Gather Together? 
Interview with Lawyer and Member of Council of Human Rights of the Russian  Presidential Administration, Vlad imir 
Ryakhovsky,” Religiya i pravo, 6 December 2016; http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/161206a.html; Lauren 
B. Homer, “Making Sense of the Anti-Missionary Provisions of Russia’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation,” East-West  
Church and Ministry Report 25 (Spring 2017), 1-7; Roman Lunkin, “Russia: Anti-Evangelism Law Used Against 
Foreigners Who Speak in Church,” Human Rights Without Frontiers, 22 September 2016; http://hrwf.eu/russia-anti-
evangelism-law-used-against-foreigners-who...; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual 
Report 2019; https://www.uscirf.gov/reports/; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Inventing 
Extremists: The Impact of Russian Anti-Extremis m Policies on Freedom of Religion and Belief,” 2017;  
https://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/special-reports/inventing -extremists-the-impact-russian-extremis m-policies ;  
U.S. Department of State, 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Russia; 
https://www.state.gov/reports/2018...: “Yarovaya Law Strikes Protestants; Interview with Historian of Religion Elena 
Glavatskaia,” Ploitsovet, 19 January 2018; https://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/180119c.html; William 
Yoder, “A Commentary on Russia’s New Anti-Terror Legislation” 15 July 2016; rea-moskva.org. 
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Belgorod, Blagoveshchensk, Chita, Kirov, Krasnoyarsk, and Smolensk. Most egregious, the state 
has turned over various non-Orthodox houses of worship to the Russian Orthodox Church: more 
than a dozen former Catholic and Lutheran churches were handed over to Orthodox in Kaliningrad, 
the former Prussian city of Konigsburg, and the same for a Catholic church in Belgorod. Lutherans 
have also unsuccessfully appealed for the return of churches in Krasnodar, Smolensk, Simferopo l, 
Sudak, Yalta, and Evpatoria.58 
 In contrast, Protestants, other than Lutherans, have few historic properties that would be 
eligible for restitution, though two secularized Baptist sanctuaries in Kaliningrad and St. 
Petersburg should be candidates.59 Instead, Protestant struggles for places to worship typically 
have involved the denial of building permits, Orthodox pressure on local owners to refuse or to 
revoke lease and rental agreements, and local officials prohibiting the use of private residences for 
worship. 
 It follows predictably that in this general climate of state partiality toward Orthodox and 
discrimination against non-Orthodox, Protestant seminaries would suffer. Roman Lunkin well 
summarizes this point: 
 Educational institutions founded by other [non-Orthodox] faiths and denominations— 
 above all, Protestants—function under the pressure of constant inspections, and have 
 even faced closure. The campaign against such institutions form a logical part of the 
 state’s policy of restricting non-Orthodox mission, banning worship services in private 
 homes, and barring Protestant church construction. It would be strange, after all, if the 
 authorities looked kindly upon Christians receiving higher theological education 
unimpeded, while at the same time placing fines on them and confiscating their property.60 
  
 
Conflicting Views on the Applicability of Religious Versus Educational Legislation Upon 
Seminaries 
 The precise legislative basis for Rosobrnadzor audits and penalties imposed upon 
Protestant seminaries is a matter of debate. Reporter Victoria Arnold, in a detailed treatment of the 
subject for the freedom of conscience news service Forum 18, contends, “Religious educational 
institutions are under no obligation to acquire state accreditation, and many have operated for years 
58 Lunkin, “Theology,” 13. See also Sophia Kishkovsky, “Russia to Return Church Property,” New York Times, 23 
November 2010. 
59 Lunkin, “Theology,” 13. 
60 Lunkin, “Theology,” 11. 
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without it, including the Baptist and Pentecostal seminaries discussed here, the Catholic Church’s 
Mary, Queen of the Apostles Higher Seminary in St. Petersburg, and the Lutheran Church 
Seminary in Novosaratovka, near St. Petersburg.” Furthermore, Rosobrnadzor inspections are 
undertaken on the basis of “somewhat vague legislation [that] may be misapplied, e.g. in the two 
parallel systems of state-accredited and non-state-accredited religious educational institutions.” 61 
Regarding 2018-19 audits of Moscow’s Baptist and Pentecostal seminaries, Arnold 
wonders “why inspectors had treated the courses offered by these religious educational 
establishments as if they were state-accredited and therefore obliged to abide by state 
requirements, when according to the law…such institutions have the right to offer non-state-
accredited programmes which must conform only to the standards of the responsible religious 
organization.” The consequence, she argues, is “the possibility of disproportionate punishment for 
infractions which are minor or which institutions themselves insist they have not committed. Such 
punishments include suspension of admissions, suspension of activities, and revocation of 
licences–all of which arguably have a greater longer-term impact on an institution’s functioning 
than a fine.”62  
In contrast to Forum 18’s interpretation, Russian authorities insist–and carry the day– that 
Protestant seminaries are subject to both 1997 legislation, “On Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Associations” (125-FZ), as amended 19 times between 2000 and 2016,63 and 2012 
legislation, “On Education in the Russian Federation” (273-FZ). As Moscow Evangelical Christian 
Seminary President Sergei Chervonenko relates, 2018-19 Rosobrnadzor inspections focused on 
provisions of 2012 “On Education” legislative requirements, “practically without touching or 
gently circumventing everything related to 125-FZ [the 1997 Law On Freedom of Conscience].” 
Chervonenko continues, “In practice, it turned out that some religious universities [and seminar ies] 
were not ready for such a development of events and emphasized their religious status.” 
Nevertheless, “Those [seminaries] that insisted that they were not bound by the requirements of 
the 2012 law proved to be mistaken.”64 
61 Victoria Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions to Protestant Theological Education ‘Systemic, Intentional’?” Forum 18, 
25 March 2019. 
62 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.” 
63 https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/russia/2941574/on-freedom-of-conscience-and-relig ious -
associations-act.html. 
64 Chervonenko, “Proverka.” 
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 A key mechanism for state (Rosobrnadzor) oversight of higher education is its authority to 
license and accredit.65 A license permits an institution to conduct educational programs and to 
admit students, while accreditation allows an institution “to award nationally recognized degrees,” 
to extend military deferments to students, and to afford graduates the right to seek employment in 
the government sector and to pursue graduate degrees in state-accredited universities.66 
 A series of 2008 Rosobrnadzor higher education inspections determined that many private 
sector programs, including many Protestant seminaries, were operating without a valid license, 
and as a result, were forced to close.67 More recently, between January 2018 and March 2019, 
Rosobrnadzor conducted audits of 16 religious educational programs (two Russian Orthodox, three 
Muslim, three Baptist, two Pentecostal, one Adventist, and five additional Protestant). Inspectors 
recorded violations in all but one case.68 Penalties ran the gamut: fines, suspended or revoked 
licenses, suspension of admissions, suspension of instruction, and revocation of accreditation. As 
Andrei Kortunov observed, “This dependency has been considered by the majority of the Russian 
educational community to be a liability, and all the history of the Russian higher education 
demonstrates continuous attempts of universities to achieve more autonomy from state 
bureaucrats.”69 
 Victoria Arnold’s Forum 18 reporting devotes considerable space to the consequences of 
2018-19 inspections upon three Protestant institutions–Moscow Theological Seminary of 
Evangelical Christians-Baptists (MTS), the Eurasian Theological Seminary of the Russian 
Pentecostal Union (ETS), and the interdenominational Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary 
(MECS).  
 
Moscow Theological Seminary of Evangelical Christians-Baptists 
        Moscow Theological Seminary (MTS) has been the leading pastoral training program of the 
Evangelical Christian-Baptist (ECB) Union. Successor to the correspondence course permitted by 
Soviet authorities beginning in 1968, its residential instruction commenced in 1993 in Moscow in 
the ECB headquarters on Varshavskoye Shosse, shifting in 2002 to its own facility in a renovated 
65 Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 204. 
66 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 17; Lunkin, “Theology,” 11. 
67 Chervonenko, “Proverka.” 
68 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.”                                 
69 Kortunov, “Russian Higher Education,” 204. 
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elementary school building. At the beginning of 2020 MTS was instructing some 375 students in 
Moscow and another 555 in eight additional distance learning centers across Russia.70 
 Following an October 2018 inspection, Rosobrnadzor cited MTS for “gross violation of 
the requirements and conditions of a special permit (license),” leading to a court case against the 
school on 18 October. The seminary submitted responses to Rosobrnadzor citations on 19 
November and 28 December. Meanwhile, on 27 December Moscow’s Perovo District Court found 
the seminary non-compliant and ordered a 60-day suspension of activities.71  
In the midst of a follow-up inspection, 15-17 January 2020, a seminary appeal of the court 
decision failed. The suspension began on 25 January with the sealing of the building by bailiffs. 
On 15 February 2020 Rosobrnadzor also imposed a ban on new MTS admissions. Courts 
subsequently extended the suspension, including a prohibition on the use of the seminary building 
for any purpose. At this point the seminary reverted to a non-formal, non-credit instructiona l 
program back on the premises of the ECB headquarters building under conditions reminiscent of 
the semi-underground pastoral training of the Soviet era.  
Most recently, on 27 February 2020, came word of a Moscow arbitration court’s revocation 
of the MTS license. According to the seminary’s stunned Vice-Rector for Academic Affairs 
Aleksei Markevich,  
The main complaint of a “violation” of licensing requirements was the “incorrect” form of 
a document describing the teaching load, although this form was developed in accordance 
with the law…. Revocation of a license is an extreme measure, which the government uses 
when an organization, by its activity, grossly violates the law and threatens society, the 
state, or citizens. Evidently the judge saw in our seminary such a threat. Many ask, what is 
the reason for such a decision. I see it as a carte blanche that is given to the Russian 
bureaucracy and the lack of independent judicial procedures. But that is my personal 
opinion, a person who has tried for a year and a half to do everything to satisfy this 
bureaucracy [Rosobrnadzor], which turned out to be impossible. 
 
Two months prior, in December 2019, perhaps in anticipation of a worst-case scenario, Rector 
Peter Mitskevich had written in a communication to the entire ECB denomination, “We want to 
70 Elliott, “Protestant Theological Education,” 14; Dale Kemp, email to author, 25 February 2020;  
russianleadership.org/our-ministry/. A goal for 2020 for Russian Leadership Ministries is to facilitate the opening of 
additional distance learning centers in Smolensk, Bryansk, Elabuga, and Krasnodar. Moscow Theological Seminary 
Annual Report, 2019. 
71 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions;” Dale Kemp, email to author, 25 February 2020. 
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be obedient to God here. It is all in His hands. We will train people to be gospel servants whether 
it is unofficial in the church, or in an official seminary context.”72  
         Mitskevich, who has served as rector of MTS since 2007 and as president of the ECB Union 
since 2017, has clearly been laboring under a formidable administrative burden.73 His heavy 
workload, which also includes pastoring Moscow’s Golgotha ECB Church since 2004, means he 
may not always have been able to give sufficient attention to documentation that a highly 
bureaucratic Russian administration requires and that a truly fulltime rector would have been able 
to oversee. In addition, Roman Lunkin suggests, “Rosobrnadzor bureaucrats expect documentat ion 
to be drawn up by the experts they have recommended. Protestant institutions like the Moscow 
Baptist Seminary insist on their independence, however, and thus have ended up adopting a 
confrontational approach.”74  
To have survived intact in its bouts with the Ministry of Education and Science, Lunkin 
believes MTS leadership would have to have been “more polite and loyal.”75 Rosobrnadzor, for 
its part, is increasingly combative towards any institution that fails to sufficiently conform. In an 
interview with Roman Lunkin, Dr. Mitskevich shared his belief that the climate of distrust of non-
Orthodox fostered by the 2016 Yarovaya “Anti-Terrorist” Law helps explain the troubles faced by 
his seminary: 
Any law can result in benefit or harm, and unfortunately the Yarovaya Law has 
brought much harm; it has in essence become an anti-missionary law that has instilled fear 
among believers and created problems for churches. I am a doctor by profession, and I 
often think about how not to cause harm but instead to help. Yet the first thought of our 
security agencies is usually to look for guilt and a concrete reason why someone may be 
prosecuted. The Church’s calling is to spread faith—that is what missionary activity is 
about. Yet how often are we not healed, helped, or warned here, but forced into a corner 
straight away, as when Rosobrnadzor suspended the activity of our Moscow Theologica l 
Seminary in early 2019. Our country must try to walk the path of prayer with God and trust 
72 “Court Revokes License of Moscow Theological Seminary of Evangelical Christians -Baptists,” Invictory.org, 28 
February 2020; translated in Russia Religion News; https://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/200228a.html;  Peter 
Mitskevich, “Words from the President – December 2019,” 28 December 2019;  
https://baptist.org.ru/en/news/view/articles/1535153. See also Lunkin, “Theology,” 11-12;  Michael Thom, “Russia 
Shuts Down Baptist and Pentecostal Seminaries,” 2 April 2019; https://Baptist.org.ru/en/news/vies/article/153515;  
https://www.chvnradio.com/christian-news/russia-shuts-down-baptist-and-pentecostal-seminaries. Markevich related 
to MTS professor Nikolai Kornilov that documentation required by state inspectors was amounting to a mountain of 
paperwork. Nikolai Kornilov, interview, 23 May 2019. 
73William Yoder, “Peter Mitskevich, New President of the Russian Union of Evangelical Christians -Baptists,” China 
Christian Daily,” 12 June 2018; Roman Lunkin, interview, 22 May 2019. 
74 Lunkin, “Theology,” 12. 
75 Roman Lunkin, interview, 22 May 2019. 
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for one another, but we are ruled by suspicion, fear, and doubt. There is no desire for 
reconciliation; everyone is shut away from everyone else behind iron doors. The Yarovaya 
Law has become a law of intimidation that can be used at any moment against any preacher, 
whereas there should be an enlightened and respectful attitude towards religious 
believers.76 
 
 A number of individuals interviewed by this author in Moscow in May 2019 expressed an 
opinion similar to one voiced by journalist Dr. William Yoder in March 2020, that MTS “had 
refused to do the necessary homework and instead chose to accuse the state. No one I heard in 
Moscow claimed there is a general, state-introduced closing of seminaries in the country. But my 
impression may be too optimistic.”77 Whatever shortcomings MTS may have been guilty of in 
terms of paperwork, ongoing troubles with state inspections at a host of additional Protestant 
institutions would suggest a pattern of discrimination that goes well beyond one seminary’s 
purported insufficient attention to state higher education documentation requirements. This author 
is in receipt of too many communications from too many beleaguered Russian Protestant educators 
to believe otherwise. 
 In the wake of the late February 2020 court decision, Dale Kemp, president of Russian 
Leadership Ministries, which raises Western financial support for MTS, summarized the 
seminary’s present plight and prospects: “We have no accreditation; we have lost our license in 
Moscow; we are being pushed out into the churches, offering non-credit seminars.” In addition, 
fire marshal inspections in February-March 2020 generated citations that could cost the equivalent 
of $50,000 to 60,000 to remedy—in a building to which faculty and students have no access. Still, 
Kemp noted, there has been no curtailment of MTS instruction underway online, via 
correspondence, or in its distance learning centers—trends in non-residential education well 
underway before the school’s present troubles.78 As a last resort, “We are still going to appeal to 
European courts,” even though Russia often ignores their rulings.79 
 
76 Lunkin, “Theology,” 14. See also Peter Mitskevich, “Words from the President-February 2020,” 14 February 2020;  
https://baptist. org.ru/en/news/view/article/1539124. 
77 William Yoder, email to author, 14 March 2020. 
78 Over the past decade non-traditional instruction, especially online, has been a growing trend worldwide, now 
accelerating in the midst of the present corona virus pandemic [winter-spring 2020]. A recent survey of Evangelical 
seminaries worldwide documents the post-Soviet region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia as a leader in the 
movement. Paul Clark, “Survey on Online Theological Education,” Overseas Council, 2019,  4. 
79 Dale Kemp phone interview, 30 March 2020. 
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The Eurasian Theological Seminary 
 The Pentecostal Union’s Eurasian Theological Seminary (ETS) has faced the same state 
scrutiny as MTS. Following an inspection 19-22 February 2018, Rosobrnadzor ordered ETS to 
correct cited violations by 22 March 2018. Forum 18’s Arnold writes,  
According to the record…on Rosobrnadzor’s website, most of these related to how  
the seminary was run day-to-day, including an apparent lack of consultation with  
student representatives, lack of provision of sporting and cultural activities, and the 
absence of particular documents on its website.”80 
 
Academy of Sciences religion scholar Roman Lunkin concurs with Arnold’s assessment: “The 
misdemeanors of which the Moscow Theological Seminary stands accused are purely 
bureaucratic.”81 
 Dissatisfied with ETS responses, Rosobrnadzor took the seminary to court, leading to a 
fine of 150,000 rubles ($2,300) by Lyublino District Court on 25 April 2018, which was upheld 
by Moscow City Court on 2 July 2018. Meanwhile, ETS faced an unplanned Rosobrnadzor 
inspection 30 April-4 May 2018, which led to a suspension of ETS admissions on 1 June 2018, a 
suspension of ETS’s license on 9 August 2018, and the annulment of its license on 23 November 
2018, at which point the seminary was “obliged to stop offering certificated courses.”82  
 In contrast to the position taken by Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary’s Sergey 
Chervonyenko that seminaries are subject to Rosobrnadzor’s accreditation as well as licensing 
standards, Pentecostal Union lawyer Vladimir Ozolin has objected to Rosobrnadzor’s  
treating the [Eurasian Theological] Seminary’s non-state-accredited theology bachelor’s 
degree as if it corresponded to the degree of theology on the Education Ministry’s formal 
“List of Areas of Higher Education Preparation – Undergraduate.” This was despite the 
materials submitted to the inspection clearly indicating that the [ETS] course was intended 
for the training of clergy and church personnel and was therefore not subject to the same 
organizational and administrative requirements as a state-accredited programme.83  
 
An official with the Church of God (Cleveland), with which ETS is affiliated, writes that the 
seminary “did face some extreme inspections on short notice along with just about every other 
evangelical seminary in Russia.” Fortunately for ETS, he writes, on 7 November 2019 the 
seminary 
80 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.” 
81 Lunkin, “Theology,” 11. 
82 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.” 
83 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions.”  
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received a new license from the Moscow City Department of Education and Science. 
Again, terminology is different, but we are still in operation. ETS currently gives training 
to about 850 people, including residential, extension, and online [programs]. It seems that 
the inspection of the seminaries in 2018 was only the first wave.84 
 
 As a member of Russia’s Public Chamber appointed by Putin in 2006, Bishop Sergei 
Ryakhovsky, head of Russia’s second-largest Pentecostal denomination, is something of a de facto 
spokesperson for all of Russia’s Protestant churches. Nevertheless, he appears to have been 
powerless to provide effectual cover on behalf of his denomination’s ETS. Nor has his appointment 
by Putin to the Public Chamber impeded increasing numbers of threats to the property of 
Pentecostal churches in Oryol, Kaluga, Nizhny Novgorod, Novorossiysk, Krasnodar, Tatarstan, 
and Tula.85 In the opinion of attorney Ozolin, state restrictions imposed upon Protestant seminarie s 
are part of a more comprehensive effort to exert “pressure…on the non-traditional confessions. ”86 
The lengthy litigation being endured by MTS & ETS, along with the close state scrutiny of many 
other Protestant seminaries (and churches), is reminiscent of the concerted court effort over the 
years to disenfranchise Salvation Army ministry in Russia.87  
 
The 2016 Anti-Extremist Law 
 Forum 18’s Victoria Arnold compiled a list of prosecutions in 2018 under the Yarovaya 
Anti-Extremist Law of 2016. Ostensibly directed at the threat posed by Islamic radicals, it in fact 
primarily targets Protestants. Of 159 known prosecutions in 2018 under this 2016 law, only 15 
took action against Russian Muslims. In contrast, Protestants faced charges of unlawful missionary 
activity in 104 cases (50 Pentecostals, 39 Baptists, 5 Seventh-day Adventists, and 10 other 
Protestants).88 The arbitrariness of Yarovaya Law enforcement is well illustrated by the fate of two 
churches in 2018 reported by Forum 18. The Good News Mission Pentecostal Church in Ufa, 
Bashkortostan, was fined 30,000 rubles ($4,600) for failure to display its official full name at its 
entrance, whereas an Evangelical Christian-Baptist House of Prayer in the Perm Region was found 
84 Church of God, emails to author, 4 and 31 December 2019. 
85 Church of God, emails to author, 4 and 31 December 2019; Lunkin, “Theology,” 13-14. 
86 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstruction.” 
87 Ian Traynor, “Russian Court Lifts Salvation Army Ban,” The Guardian, 6 March 2002. 
88 Arnold, “RUSSIA: 159.” See also Yoder, “A Commentary;” “Yarovaya Law;” Kate Shellnutt, “Russian 
Evangelicals Penalized Most Under Anti-Evangelism Law,” Christianity Today, 7 May 2019; and U.S. Department  
of State, 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Russia; https//www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-
international-religious-freedom/russia/. 
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in violation of the law because it did display its full name outside the church. According to the 
court verdict, the ECB signage amounted to “missionary activity aimed at dissemina ting 
information about the beliefs of [the church] among other persons who are not members.”89  
 
The Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary 
 The interdenominational Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary (MECS) is no stranger 
to close state oversight. Founded by One Mission Society, a U.S.-based Evangelical mission 
agency, MECS was briefly shuttered by Rosobrnadzor in the summer of 2007 for alleged “fire 
violations and for failing to offer a quality education.”90 MECS recouped and reopened, but it has 
continued to be the object of Rosobrnadzor inspections, most recently in October 2018. Being one 
of the last Protestant seminaries to face inspection in 2018, MECS drew lessons from the 
experience of others. According to MECS administrator Sergey Chervonenko, “Observing the 
results of the audit at one of the Moscow seminaries, we understood that the process would be 
difficult and tried to prepare as much as possible.” Harold Brown, OMS missionary and MECS 
board chair, characterized the most recent lead inspector as “tough,” but one who in the end upheld 
the school’s accreditation.91 
 
Other Protestant Institutions 
 Representative of Protestant seminary challenges far afield from Moscow is the experience 
of the Pentecostal Chuvash Bible Centre. In 2007 state authorities shuttered this school on grounds 
that it “conducted educational activities without authorization” and allegations of fire and 
sanitation code violations. The school took its grievance to the European Court of Human Rights 
in 2008 and eventually won its case in 2014.92 
 A Rosobrnadzor inspection of the Evangelical Christian-Baptist North Caucasus Bible 
Institute (Prokhladny, Kabardino – Balkaria Republic) on 27-28 June 2018 ended with citations 
for non-compliance with educational, sanitation, and fire safety standards. Prokhladny District 
89 Arnold, “RUSSIA: 159.” See also U.S. Department of State, 2018 Report, 7.  
90 Baker, “Russian Seminaries’ Enrollment Woes.” 
91Brown explained that Alexander Tsutserov (St. Andrews University Ph.D.) is president of Moscow Evangelical 
Christian Seminary (MECS), while Sergey Chervonenko (Asbury Theological Seminary D.Min .) is president of 
Evangelical Christian Seminary at the same location.  Brown phone interview, 22 November 2019, and Brown email, 
25 February 2020. Chervonenko explained the same arrangement to the author in a 21 May 2019 interview in Moscow. 
92“Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v Russia: ECHR, 12 June 2014;” https://swarb.co.uk/biblical-centre-of-
the-chuvash-republic-v-russia-echr-12-jun-2014; Arnold, RUSSIA: Obstructions.” 
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Court imposed a fine of 150,000 rubles ($2,300) on 27 August 2018. An additional inspection, 15-
19 October 2018, led Rosobrnadzor to charge the institute and Rector Mikhail Chizhma with 
failure to rectify educational and other violations. In November 2018 Rosobrnadzor suspended the 
school’s right to admit new students. By latest report the institute, nevertheless, continues to offer 
its educational program to the satisfaction of denominational if not state standards.93 
 Also in November 2018 Kuban Evangelical Christian University (KECS) in Krasnodar had 
its license temporarily suspended. Originally founded as Lampados Bible College under the 
sponsorship of the U.S. Christian and Missionary Alliance denomination, this seminary’s rector, 
Gennadi Pshenichny, nevertheless manages a hopeful note: “This past year we faced many 
challenges as the state education agency paid several visits to our campus. Still, God is faithful 
and we continue to work and study even though the future may at times seem uncertain.”94  
 
Further Tightening of State Requirements 
 Sergey Chervonenko (MECS) anticipates that the next hurdle that  Robsobrnadzor may 
erect is state verification of the degrees held by higher education faculty: “In the future they may 
well introduce requirements to confirm the level of teaching staff in Russia,” an especially ominous 
prospect for Protestant seminaries.95 In Russia’s current anti-Western climate closer scrutiny of 
staff degrees does not bode well for these schools which depend heavily upon Western support 
and whose administrators and faculty so often hold theological degrees from Europe and the U.S. 
It is widely recognized that Western ties and support taint Protestant institutions and Protestants 
in general.96 Case in point is Moscow’s Russian-American Christian University (RACU), one of 
only two Russian Evangelical liberal arts programs to receive state accreditation, along with 
Zaoksky Adventist University near Tula.97 RACU’s hard-won accreditation, awarded in 2003, was 
93 Arnold, “RUSSIA: Obstructions;” Lunkin, “Theology,” 12. 
94 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019. See also “Rosobrnadzor Bans Acceptance of Students to 
Seminary of Evangelical-Lutheran Church,” Interfax, 13 December 2019; interfax- 
religion.com/?act=news&div=15405. 
95 Sergey Chervonenko, “Proverka.” 
96 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019; John Burgess, phone interview with author, 16 September 
2019; Church of God, emails to author, 4 and 31 December 2019; Scott Cunningham, phone interview, 31 March 
2020; Dale Kemp, phone interview, 30 March 2020; Gennadi Sergienko, interview, 24 May 2019; U.S. Department  
of State, 2018 Report, 16. 
97 Mikhail Kulakov, God’s Soviet Miracles: How Adventists Built the First Protestant Seminary in Russian History 
(Nampa, ID: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1993); Petrenko and Glanzer, “The Recent Emergence,” 90-91. 
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lost in 2009, in good measure because Rosobrnadzor changed accreditation requirements to no 
longer credit faculty with Western doctorates in calculating the number of qualified instructors.98  
 Russian Protestant seminary faculty are now even beginning to be required to undergo  
“state-recognized advanced theological training” leading to a “diploma in theological pedagogy” 
from a secular university, “as absurd as it sounds.”99 Compounding this imposition forced upon 
Kuban Evangelical Christian University, the secular institute affiliated with Kuban State 
University that offers this new diploma has already doubled the tuition for this mandatory 
training.100 
 
“Audits” of the Auditors: From Sympathetic to Strongly Critical 
 On balance, Sergei Chervonenko (MECS) desires to give state auditors the benefit of the 
doubt: 
After a scheduled inspection of Rosobrnadzor [RON], we reported on the implementa t ion 
of the requirements and received an unscheduled inspection of RON with a new staff of 
inspectors. This taught us that different experts can interpret the requirements in different 
ways; one expert will say “normal,” the other – “violation.” Yes, that’s right, some 
decisions are subjective. It is necessary to interact with each expert individually. Difficult 
and unpredictable? Yes. Is it possible to handle this? Definitely possible…. It is important 
to interact with RON experts; they pay attention to the tone of communication of the tested, 
the willingness to listen to their comments and involvement in the correction of the 
shortcomings found. RON experts are living people, no matter how trite it sounds; they 
value a good attitude (but do not allow attempts to “grease the palm”). And even RON 
experts can make a mistake. Yes, this is so. They have to study a huge array of documents, 
and given our religious specificity, the likelihood of error increases.101 
 
Even hard-pressed Rector Pshenichny in Kuban can marshal up charity toward individua l 
Rosobrnadzor inspectors:  
When it comes to personal interactions with offic ials the situation can change…. People 
begin to ask questions and see the disparity between what they see and hear on TV [about 
Protestants] and real life. They become much more balanced and open to dialogue. Some 
of them make efforts to help us. Some become genuinely interested in Christianity.102 
98 Bernbaum, Opening the Red Door, 199; Mark R. Elliott, Review of Opening the Red Door; The Inside Story of 
Russia’s First Christian Liberal Arts University in Christianity Today online, 17 February 2020. 
99 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019. 
100 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019; Harold Brown, phone interview, 22 November 2019. In 
a 24 May 2019 interview Dr. Gennadi Sergienko also attested to Rosobrnadzor’s  move toward state validation of 
theological faculty.   
101 Sergey Chervonenko, “Proverka.”  
102 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019. 
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  Nevertheless, Pshenichny judges Rosobrnadzor’s overall implementation of oversight as 
“a profanation of education, relegating it to a piece of paper with a stamp.” He openly critiques 
this state body, which holds a Damocles Sword over the life of his seminary, in a manner that is 
both searching and courageous. When queried by the author concerning state oversight of private 
educational institutions, he judged it to be a combination of a) an effort to standardize and ensure 
quality, b) part of an overall government goal to bring all sectors of Russian society under closer 
state supervisions, and c) part of state measures to discriminate against, and in some cases, 
suppress, non-Orthodox faiths: 
 
It is common knowledge that the overall state of education in Russia leaves much to be 
desired. Therefore, I would say that it is not at all surprising that the state has taken upon 
itself the effort to standardize higher education. However, speaking from my experience in 
the field of education, I would say that ensuring quality is not a top priority of the Ministry 
of Education. It is virtually impossible to find people in today’s system who would be 
genuinely interested in education. We hear slogans and goals but that’s just words. Most 
of what we see is a vast gap between what is being proclaimed and even written on paper–
and real everyday life. The system is set up in such a way that officials have to give account 
to their supervisors and so they react only as prompted. The inspections are genuine ly 
interested only in checking off their lists and finding faults with the schools so they can 
report back to their respective supervisors and prove they are effective. They do not care 
about education in the least. In this, they are part of the larger system and not necessarily 
discriminating against one group or another. The tendency is to stifle initiative anywhere 
and lay [down a] heavy burden, which creates a façade of uniformity and order. This is just 
how things work. 
At the same time the discrimination against non-Orthodox faiths, especially evangelica ls, 
has always been there. It is twofold. First, there are those who are ideologically opposed 
and purposefully malign and denigrate non-Orthodox believers through every means 
possible. And then there are those who are “strengthening” the hands of the first group 
through ignorance. Unfortunately, evangelicals still make up a fraction of the overall 
population of the country and this works against us because the community at large is still 
in the dark about who we are. The connection with the West does not help. Current 
sentiment in the media is anti-West   and anti-US.103 
 
 In the same vein Kursk Protestant educator Aleksandr Spichak writes, “Of course, when it 
comes to Protestant schools, you cannot escape subjectivity because it is in the air in Russia, when 
the nationalism and anti-American attitude is promoted everywhere. And there might be men in 
103 Gennadi Pshenichny, email to author, 1 November 2019. 
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local administration who would use this opportunity to press more on Protestants.”104 A 
denominational leader close to the Eurasian Theological Seminary seconds the opinion of 
Pshenichny and Spichak in reference to dealings with Rosobrnadzor: “To answer your questions, 
is it a justifiable effort to standardize education? We are not of this opinion. We fulfilled all of the 
state’s demands. But there was no effort from the state to work with us to help us ensure that their 
standards were met.”105  
 Especially telling is Rosobrnadzor’s draconian treatment of two secular institutions: the 
European University of St. Petersburg and the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, 
private universities with stellar international reputations.106 Rosobrnadzor cancelled the former’s 
accreditation and revoked its license in 2016 over alleged building code infractions and took 
possession of most of its campus property in early 2018. Accreditation was restored in July 2018, 
but not before Rosobrnadzor had dealt the university a near-lethal blow.107 On 20 June 2019 
Rosobrnadzor also revoked the accreditation of the highly regarded Moscow School of Social and 
Economic Sciences which, however, was restored in March 2020.108  
 Two leading Western professional bodies, the U.S.-based Association for Slavic, East 
European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) and its sister British Association for Slavic, East 
European, and Eurasian Studies (BASEEES), publicly addressed their concerns to Russian 
authorities, expressing “great disappointment” with Rosobrnadzor actions against the two schools. 
An ASEEES press release described the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences as “one 
of the country’s most highly regarded universities” and the European University of St. Petersburg 
as “another of the country’s leading private universities.”109  
 Just as bold as Rector Pshenichny’s critique of Rosobrnadzor, the European University of 
St. Petersburg prepared a 24-page “audit” of the auditors entitled “How Does Rosobrnadzor Work: 
104 Aleksandr Spichak, email to author, 11 December 2019. 
105 Church of God, email to author, 4 December 2019. 
106 Potapova and Trines, “Education,” 17-18; “Russia’s Higher Education.” 
107 “Russia Certifies European University at St. Petersburg’s Master’s Programs,” Moscow Times, 5 July 2019. 
108 “Rector Zuev’s Comments Regarding the Denial of Accreditation for Activities in the Field of Higher Education,” 
December 2019; https://www.msses.ru/en/about/news/4083/; Grigory Yudin, “Overzealous Regulators Are Closing 
in on Russian Universities,” Moscow Times, 10 July 2018; “MSSES Got Accreditation Back,” 
linkedin.com/school/shaninka. 
109 “ASEEES Statement Concerning the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences (Shaninka),” 20 Ju ly 2018; 
https://www.aseees.org/advocacy/aseees-statement-concerning-moscow-school-social-and-economic-sciences-
shaninka. See also Scholars at Risk Network, 20 June 2018; https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/report/2018-06-20-
moscow-school-of-social-and-economic-sciences/. 
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Analysis of Open Data on Supervisory Activities in the Sphere of Higher Education.” More 
accustomed to enumerating the institutional shortcomings of others, Rosobnrnadzor in this 
instance was subjected to a searching critique of its own ethical and procedural shortcomings. The 
European University report gave this state higher education watchdog a low, if not failing, grade 
in a wide-ranging series of findings:  
 The number of higher education institutions is decreasing year by year. However, the 
number of supervisory activities is increasing. 
 Private universities are much more likely to be inspected. Effective performance 
indicators do not significantly reduce the likelihood of an inspection….The actual 
inspection is largely detached from the monitoring results and it is not always consistent 
with the performance indicators developed by the Ministry of Education. 
 The procedure of selecting experts [auditors] does not prevent the enlisting of 
specialists who have violated ethical norms in their professional activities. Among 
these experts there are authors of dissertations with sizeable borrowings from other 
people’s texts. Indicators of the publication activity of such experts demonstrate that 
they are on average more prone to manipulating formal performance indicators of 
academic activity than most other lecturers. 
 Inspections are increasingly being carried out remotely, in the form of working with 
documents without visiting the university. The inspectors focus on minor violat ions 
mainly related to documenting the work of the institution.110  
 
Regarding inspections not conducted on site that are cited in the final bullet, it should be noted that 
in all known cases Protestant seminaries have undergone in-person inspections. Given their small 
enrollments, compared to those of most other private institutions and all state universities, might 
this focused attention on Protestants have more to do with discrimination against a suspect 
religious minority than with the goal of fostering high educational standards?  
 
110 Katerina Guba, Aleksandra Makeeva, Mikhail Sokolov, and Anzhelika Tsivinskaya, “Kak rabotaet Rosobrnadzor: 
analiz otkrytykh dannykh o kontrolʹ no—nadzornoi deyatelʹ nost v sfere vysshego obrazovaniya [“How Does 
Rosobrnadzor Work: Analysis of Open Data on Supervisory Activities in the Sphere of Higher Education],” St. 
Petersburg: European University in St. Petersburg, 2017; https//eusp.org/en/news/how-does-rosobrnadzor-work-
analysis-of-open-data-supervisory-activities-in-the-sphere-of-higher-education. 
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Conclusion 
 In sum, Russian Protestant seminaries are presently undergoing a trial by state inspection 
that threatens their very existence. Academics Perry Glanzer and Konstantin Petrenko are correct 
in asserting that the Russian state’s “power to license and accredit” is “the power of life and death” 
over any educational institution.111 
 State justifications for close oversight of Protestant seminaries appear overstated at best 
and lack credibility at worst. As regards state concerns for quality control, should not the Russ ian 
constitution’s requirement for separation of church and state take precedence over a secular 
government’s presumption to instruct believers on how best to train their clergy? 
 Russia’s declining student-age population has led leaders in public higher education to 
lobby the state to curtail private universities and institutes. And on its own account the state has 
concluded the country needs far fewer tertiary institutions in general. But Russia’s Protestant 
population of approximately two percent means the quite modest enrollments in its non-state-
funded seminaries cannot possibly be a demographic threat to public higher education.112 
 The concerted efforts of the administration of President Vladimir Putin to exert ever greater 
control over all sectors of Russian life is much in keeping with the country’s longstanding tradition 
of authoritarian rule. Russia’s Protestant seminaries labor under the additional burden of the 
common, Russian media-stoked perception of Protestantism as a Western import—and this in a 
climate of chauvinistic nationalism and xenophobia. A Russian News Agency TASS release of 6 
April 2020 underscores this ever-present threat to Protestant seminaries. Proposed Duma 
legislation would further impair the work of “foreign NGOs,” including “foreign-funded 
educational programmes…likely to be subjected to additional sanction and scrutiny.”113  Such a 
prospect would further jeopardize those Protestant seminaries that still receive financial support 
from abroad. 
 A key question addressed in this study centers on the Russian state’s motivation for 
increased state restrictions on Protestant seminaries. Has it been to ensure quality, or to strengthen 
state control over all sectors of Russian society, or to discriminate against non-Orthodox 
111 Glanzer and Petrenko, “Private Christian Colleges,” 11. 
112 The two percent estimate is based on the current Russian Federation population of 145,872,000 (United Nations 
World Population Review; worldpopulationreview.com) and Roman Lunkin’s calculation that the number of the 
country’s Protestant adherents “is approaching 3 million” (Pyat’sot let vmeste,” Nezavisamaya gazeta—Religii, 18 
October 2017; http://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2017-10-18/13_430_together.html). 
113 William Yoder, “Russian Seminaries Remain in Limbo: The Future Remains Uncertain,” 6 April 2020.  
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believers—or some combination of the three? One Russian Orthodox educator, who prefers not to 
be identified, rejects the idea that new government requirements placed on Protestant seminar ies 
amounts to persecution. He argues, for example, that Baptists did not do their homework in 
preparing documents for inspectors. In sum, he sees the government upholding standards for all 
educational institutions to ensure quality, a process he considers normal and positive.114 
 A contrasting view is held by Dale Kemp of Russian Leadership Ministries who believes 
the state’s desire for improved quality is a minor consideration—if one at all. Rather, he views the 
goal of increased secular control and discrimination against non-Orthodox to be the chief state 
motivators, an opinion held by most Protestant educators who have fared poorly in Ministry of 
Education inspections.115 
 In the present COVID-19 pandemic, Evangelical seminaries and churches, like all other 
Russian institutions, have closed their doors to gatherings of any size for the duration of the crisis. 
Acting in bad faith, might Russian authorities prolong restrictions upon gatherings of non-
Orthodox beyond the point of medical necessity? Fears that authoritarian regimes might take 
advantage of emergency measures to undermine the rule of law have already surfaced not only in 
the case of Russia, but as regards Hungary, Serbia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.116 
 Finally, a particularly questionable justification for increasing Russian state oversight of 
private higher education, including Protestant seminaries, is the purported goal of rooting out 
corruption. Official campaigns against it are a predictable, periodic feature of Russian politica l 
life. Unfortunately, a tradition also prevails of a self-aggrandizing bureaucracy seeking its own 
benefit over the interests of state and society. How then is a corrupt state capable of elimina ting 
corruption in higher education, public or private? And in the case of Protestant seminaries, the 
Ministry of Education, notwithstanding its proclivity to find fault, does not even bother to charge 
corruption in Protestant seminaries, where it is rare to non-existent. Similarly, what effort have 
114 Russian Orthodox educator interview, 23 May 2019. 
115 Dale Kemp, phone interview, 30 March 2020.  
116  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty releases: “EU Warns Against Using Pandemic to Undermine Democracy” and 
“Members of U.S. Congress Criticize Additional Powers for Orban in Corona Emergency,” 31 March 2020; “Pod cast: 
COVID-19 and the ‘Dictatorship of Law’,” 6 April 2020; “Amnesty Slams ‘Offensive’ Against Human Rights in 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia,” 12 April 2020; “HRW Says Azerbaijan Abuses COVID-19 Restrictions to Crack Down 
on  Critics,” 16 April 2020; and “Rights Defenders Accuse Kazakh Authorities of Using Coronavirus Restrictions to 
Stifle Dissent,” 20 April 2020. 
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auditors expended to understand Evangelical subculture when they insist upon letter-of-the- law 
“No Smoking” signage in a building in which no one smokes?117           
       In contrast to the problematic interventions of Rosobrnadzor, since the 1990s many 
Protestant theological schools have chosen self-regulation through their own commendably 
professional Euro-Asian Accrediting Association (E-AAA).118 The Russian Ministry of Education 
and Science could learn a great deal from the example of E-AAA in the promotion and facilita t ion 
of high professional standards in tertiary education. Dr. Walter Sawatsky (Anabaptist Mennonite 
Biblical Seminary) details its achievements in a forthcoming publication, “The Amazing Story of 
E-AAA (Euro-Asian Accrediting Association).” Here we have an enumeration of the association’s 
exemplary role as “a leader in shaping and building up a Slavic Evangelical ministry for the sake 
of the churches, to foster a consciously Slavic theology, and also contextual sensitivity in Central 
Asia.” In addition to supportive, rather than confrontational, seminary accreditation site visits, E-
AAA has facilitated the publication of classroom texts (Bible Pulpit Series), theological serials 
(especially the bilingual Bogoslovskie razmyshleniya/Theological Reflections), Evangelica l 
archival guides and compendia, theological reference works (such as the Slavic Bible 
Commentary),119 the regular hosting of academic and pedagogical conferences, and especially 
commendable, the promotion of “cooperation across a spectrum of [theological and nationa l] 
differences.” In contrast, Sawatsky suspects “Putin’s new controls on Russian education…had 
more to do with blocking innovation than seeking ‘best practices’.”120 Thus, it can reasonably be 
argued that Russian society and the rule of law would best be served if the state simply left its 
Protestant seminaries to their own devices. 
 
  
117 Gennadi Sergienko, interview, 24 May 2019. 
118 www.e-aaa.org. 
119 Peter Penner, Review of The Slavic Bible Commentary, East-West Church and Ministry Report 25 (Winter 2017): 
4-5. 
120 Walter Sawatsky would like to see “more voices urging the Russian Education department to back off of its efforts 
to control theological schools.” Walter Sawatsky, email to author, 1 April 2020. 
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Appendix: Interviews and Correspondence 
Interviews 
John Burgess (phone), Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 16 September 2019  
Harold Brown (phone), One Mission Society, 22 November 2019  
Sergey Chervonenko, Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary, 21 May 2019  
Scott Cunningham (phone), Overseas Council, 31 March 2020 
Dale Kemp, Russian Leadership Ministries, 30 March 2020 
Nikolai Kornilov, Moscow Theological Seminary, 23 May 2019  
Roman Lunkin, Russian Academy of Sciences, 22 May 2019  
Russian   Orthodox educator, 23 May 2019 
Gennadi Sergienko, Second Evangelical Christian-Baptist Church and Moscow 
Theological Seminary, 24 May 2019  
Email Correspondence 
Sergey Chervonenko, Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary, 23 August 2019 
Church of God (Cleveland) official, 4 and 31 December 2019 
Gennadi Pshenichny, Kuban Evangelical Christian University, 1 November 2019 
Russian denominational leader, 25 October 2019 
Walter Sawatsky, Anabaptist Mennonite Biblical Seminary, 14 March 2020 
“Ivan Smirnov,” 9 and 12 January 2020 
Aleksandr Spichak, Trinity Video Seminary, 11 December 2019 
William Yoder, Russian Evangelical Alliance, 14 March 2020 
Olga Zaprometova, St. Filaret Orthodox Christian Institute, 9 October 2019 
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